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Decentralisation of decision-making in active labour market policy makes it possible to
use local information to the fullest, but may also impinge on the fulfilment of national
objectives, as suggested by principal-agent theory. The purpose of this study is to ex-
amine the effects of a Swedish pilot programme in 1996, which strengthened the role of
the local authorities in labour market policy in parts of the country. Survey evidence
suggests a non-negligible divergence between the objectives of the municipality repre-
sentatives and the central government’s goals. Regarding programme effects, our
econometric findings do not indicate any increase in geographical lock-in of the unem-
ployed, but decentralisation seems to spur local initiatives in the form of labour market
programmes organised by the municipalities. In addition, targeting on outsiders is to
some extent more common in municipal projects than in others.
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1 Introduction
Decentralisation of decision-making to the local level may increase the effi-
ciency of active labour market programmes (ALMPs), since the knowledge that
local authorities have about local conditions is used to its full potential. A
weakness with decentralisation, however, is that it may impinge on the fulfil-
ment on national objectives. Local authorities often face financial incentives
that seem to increase this risk. For example, municipal budgets may be fa-
vourably affected by shifting persons from social assistance, which in Sweden
is funded by the local authorities, to participation in labour market pro-
grammes, financed by the central government. In addition, some programmes,
such as relief work, may crowd out regular municipal jobs and thus subsidise
labour. The programmes may also serve as a means of increasing or maintain-
ing local population and the municipal tax base, by reducing migration among
the unemployed.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of a Swedish pilot pro-
gramme in 1996 that strengthened the role of the local government in labour
market policy in certain municipalities. The local employment service com-
mittees (arbetsförmedlingsnämnd) in 25 municipalities were reformed so that
the representatives of municipal authorities should constitute the majority of
the committees’ members. These committees – henceforth ESCs – are co-
operative, advisory bodies at the local level and part of the National Labour
Market Administration, with the purpose of adapting labour market policy to
local conditions.
1 Since the pilot programme affected the role of the munici-
palities only in certain areas of the country, it offers an opportunity to compare
outcomes in the decentralised programme municipalities versus other, less de-
centralised, non-programme municipalities.
Empirical evidence concerning decentralisation of ALMPs should be of im-
portance, since very little is known about the effects in general of local in-
                                                     
1 The ESCs should not be confused with the public employment service offices (arbetsförmed-
ling), which also operate at the local level. The public employment service offices provide em-
ployment services and make decisions about placements in ALMPs.2
volvement in these policies.
2 Some OECD countries have shifted the emphasis
of labour market expenditures from passive measures – such as the payment of
unemployment benefits - to more of active measures in the 1990s (Calmfors &
Skedinger, 1995; OECD, 1995). In addition, perceived inefficiencies in em-
ployment services have triggered a general trend towards decentralisation of
ALMPs (European Commission, 1996). So far, there is only scant evidence
concerning whether the efforts towards decentralisation have actually contrib-
uted to improving the effectiveness of ALMPs or not.
Traditional labour market policy in Sweden has not only emphasised active
measures, but has also allowed a great deal of freedom for the National Labour
Market Administration in the choice of measures for reducing unemployment.
ALMPs are designed and carried out by the regional and local tiers of the Ad-
ministration according to the principles of the ”management by objectives”
policy ( målstyrning), which minimises detailed regulation (Niklasson &
Tomsmark, 1994). A new feature in recent years is that the municipalities have
become increasingly involved in ALMPs, although the responsibility for these
policies still lies with the government. It is estimated that in 1999 around
80,000 persons were engaged in programmes organised by the municipalities
and, at least partly, financed by the government, which is roughly 40 per cent
of participants in all ALMPs. In addition, some programmes are both organised
and fully financed by the municipalities. Around 8,000 persons were engaged
in such programmes in 1998 (Svenska Kommunförbundet, 1999). An important
factor behind the involvement of the municipalities in ALMPs is that the local
authorities have assumed responsibility for young people who have either quit
school or not been able to find work after it. This obligation has resulted in the
set-up of large programmes targeted towards youths.
Principal-agent theory, which concerns the relationship between a principal
(the central government in this case) and an agent (the municipality), is appli-
cable to the issues studied in this paper. The problem for the principal is how to
make the agent act according to the objectives of the principal. The theory pre-
                                                     
2 Some evidence is available regarding decentralisation in other policy areas. For example, De
Groot (1988) examines decentralisation of decision-making to Dutch hospitals, while King & Ma
(2000) provide evidence on the effects of fiscal decentralisation in OECD countries. For surveys
regarding the effects of active labour market policies, without consideration of decentralisation
issues, see Calmfors (1994) and Fay (1996). Informal discussions of the Swedish experiences of
decentralisation of decision-making in labour market policy can be found in Lundin (1999), Ny-
berg & Skedinger (1998) and SAF (1999).3
dicts that, in the presence of asymmetric information, decision-making is de-
centralised to the agent if (i) the divergence of objectives of the principal and
agent is small enough; and (ii) local initiatives are important for the success of
outcomes (Aghion & Tirole, 1997; De Groot, 1988).
Our empirical study makes use of an events database (HÄNDEL), which
contains micro-data on all registered persons in open unemployment and all
participants in ALMPs in Sweden. We will also present results from a ques-
tionnaire that was distributed to a sample of ESC members. It will be examined
(i) to what extent the government’s and the committee members’ objectives di-
verge; (ii) whether decentralisation is associated with geographical lock-in of
the unemployed; (iii) whether decentralisation leads to an increase in local ini-
tiatives as measured by the share of participants in projects organised by the
municipality; and whether (iv) municipalities are more inclined to target meas-
ures towards outsiders on the labour market than other project organisers.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses the theory of
decentralisation of decision-making and how to apply it in the context of ana-
lysing ESCs. In Section 3, the committees and the pilot programme are de-
scribed and evidence concerning divergence of objectives is presented. Section
4 sets out the methodology for evaluating the pilot programme effects, d e-
scribes the data and reports on the econometric results. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 Theory of decentralisation
The purpose of this section is to provide a theoretical background to decentrali-
sation and to discuss its applicability to the study of local employment service
committees. The discussion is quite rudimentary and a formal analysis, on
which the presentation draws, is available in, e.g., Aghion & Tirole (1997) and
De Groot (1988).
An increasing literature is concerned with the principal-agent relationship,
where a principal contracts an agent to undertake actions. Many different areas
are characterised by this type of relationship: Stockholders vs. managers, em-
ployers vs. employees, central vs. local government, etc. An important feature
in the design of the optimal contract, from the perspective of the principal, is
the degree of decentralisation of decision-making to the agent.4
The literature identifies the main benefit from decentralisation as the poten-
tial to use superior information of the agent.
3 Under decentralisation, the prin-
cipal avoids the risk of utility loss due to incomplete information about the pa-
rameters of the problem to be solved and will thus not be forced to optimise on
less precise values. It is also argued that the incentives of the decentral actor
may change, with endogeneity of local initiatives, so as to increase the likeli-
hood of successful implementation. The agent’s propensity to acquire informa-
tion and take own initiatives increases, to the extent that the principal credibly
commits himself not to intervene.
4 In addition, there may be a ”commitment ef-
fect” to self-made decisions.
The main cost with decentralisation is that the principal loses control of the
agent’s actions. The probability that the agent undertakes actions diminishing
the principal’s utility increases to the extent that the interests of the two parties
diverge.
5
The key aspect in the principal-agent problem is the presence of asymmetric
information. Unless the agent is better informed than the principal, there is no
need for decentralisation of decision-making. Decentralisation is more likely to
occur when (i) there is asymmetric information; (ii) the divergence of objec-
tives of the principal and agent is small enough; and (iii) local initiatives are
important for the success of outcomes. The implications of the theory for our
study of ESCs will be discussed below.
The principal is the central government and the agents are the local em-
ployment service committees, the chairman and majority of which consists of
members representing the municipality. It is not difficult to accept the realism
of assuming asymmetric information in the present context. The ESCs obvi-
ously are better informed about local labour market conditions, which indeed is
the rationale for the setting up the committees. The municipality is a large local
employer and other committee members, representing regional and local tiers
                                                     
3 A poorly informed principal may of course try to gather more information, but it is in many
cases prohibitively costly to do so.
4 According to Aghion & Tirole (1997), overload on part of the principal is a mechanism that
makes non-intervention credible.
5 Investments in (costly) training, restricting the set of possible actions as well as properly de-
signed incentives, e.g., profit-sharing in private firms, could be means of reducing the divergence
itself or its effects. Incentive schemes are, however, less straightforward to apply in government
bureaucracies, due to the multi-faceted objectives that typically characterise the public sector.5
of the National Labour Market Administration, the business community and
trade unions, also are likely to possess relevant local knowledge.
The representatives of the National Labour Market Administration have a
supervisory role in the committees. The set of possible actions may be r e-
stricted and information about the activities is collected and reported to the
principal. It is important to note that this structure also introduces the possibil-
ity of collusion, where the supervisor acts as an advocate for the agent (Tirole,
1986).
Regarding divergence of objectives, it should be noted that the municipali-
ties have other priorities besides providing efficient labour market policies.
Municipal budgets may be favourably affected by shifting persons from social
assistance, which is funded by the local authorities, to participation in labour
market programmes, financed by the central government. In addition, some
programmes, such as relief work, may crowd out regular jobs and thus subsi-
dise labour in the services that typically local authorities provide, e.g., infra-
structure, health, children’s day-care and old age care. The programmes may
also serve as a means of increasing or maintaining local population and the
municipal tax base, by reducing migration among the unemployed. The poten-
tial divergence of objectives will be assessed by comparing the national objec-
tives, as laid out in various policy documents, with questionnaire information
on the views of the committee members.
We will also consider a potential consequence of diverging objectives,
namely the extent to which unemployed persons are locked-in geographically.
It is assumed that the jobless react to various measures undertaken by the local
authorities following decentralisation. If the jobless do not anticipate the ac-
tions of the local authorities, the sequencing of effects is such that changes in
the behaviour of the municipalities precede changes in lock-in. In the opposite
case, e.g., if the municipalities announce changes in advance, it is possible that
the jobless adapt behaviour prior to actual changes in municipal labour market
policy.
A suitable measure of local initiatives is the share of ALMPs that are or-
ganised by the municipality. It is reasonable to assume that the local authorities
have more control of the projects, concerning design as well as the profile of
the participants, if the programme is organised by the municipality than if or-
ganised by other actors. On the one hand, this control makes it easier to use lo-6
cal information and to target measures towards groups with special needs.
6 On
the other hand, the possibility is introduced to pursue other goals, e.g., im-
proving municipal budgets in ways described above. Our hypotheses are that
decentralisation leads to more projects being organised by the municipality and
to more focus on outsiders in the labour market.
3 Local employment service commit-
tees
7
The ESCs are co-operative bodies at the local level in Sweden and part of the
National Labour Market Administration. Figure 1 illustrates the position of the
ESC in the organisation. In 1999, there were 283 ESCs, i.e., one in almost
every municipality, with 8-16 seats in each committee. In these bodies various
local representatives act together with the purpose of adapting the labour mar-
ket policy to local conditions.
It is stipulated that certain interests should be represented in the committees.
Members should include local representatives from the Public Employment
Service offices (PES), the County Labour Boards ( länsarbetsnämnd), trade
unions and the business community and since 1997 the municipalities in all re-
gions nominate the chairman and a majority of the committees’ members.
Apart from that, the rules governing the committees’ activities are not very
precise and the central government has delegated to the County Labour Boards
to specify the tasks of the ESCs in more detail.
                                                     
6 Calmfors & Lang (1995) argue that targeting of ALMPs towards ”outsiders” increases em-
ployment, via increasing wage competition with ”insiders”.
7 This section is based on Government Regulation (1988:1139), Government bill (1995/96:222),
Report from the Committee of Finance (1995/96:FiU15) and Lundin (1999).7
Figure 1. The Swedish National Labour Market Administration in 1999.
In a document called beslutsordning (decision-making regulations) the County
Labour Boards specify the role of the ESCs. According to the documents, the
ESCs should have a general collaborative function in all counties. The com-
mittees should initiate different projects, suggest changes in labour market
policies when necessary and co-ordinate the activities of various actors (for ex-
ample, the municipalities and the PES offices) that are carrying out and fi-
nancing labour market projects. There are also some more concrete tasks de-
fined. All County Labour Boards have delegated to the ESCs the task of ap-
pointing the budget for the PES offices and in all counties but one the commit-
tees also decide on the working plans for the offices. The task of drawing up
budgets and working plans is however the responsibility of the PES offices.
Through this process the ESCs lay down the broad outlines for the work at the
local level. The direct influence on the budget and the working plan is probably
limited, but the co-ordination of various projects and other initiatives is likely
to indirectly affect the budget and the working plan.

















Other activities of the ESC vary across regions. In certain counties the
committees should decide on the organisation of the PES offices, decide on the
use of untraditional funding
8 and prepare and comment on Objective 3 projects.
The latter are partly funded by the European Union and are intended to increase
employment among outsiders, i.e., young people, the handicapped, long-term
unemployed and immigrants. For Objective 3 measures, the administrative hi-
erarchy of Figure 1 applies, but there is also a parallel organisation (Ams,
1996). At the national level, there is the Monitoring Committee, the members
of which represent the European Commission, the Swedish government, trade
unions and employer organisations. There are also regional and local commit-
tees assisting the County Labour Boards with organising the programme. In
some counties it is the ESC that serves as the local committee for Objective 3
measures.
3.1 The 1996 pilot programme
In 1996 the government initiated a pilot programme, in which 25 municipalities
took part.
9 The idea behind the programme was to gain more information about
the consequences of decentralisation of active labour market policy. This study
is concerned with the first part of the programme, where the role of the munici-
palities in the ESCs was strengthened in certain areas. Specifically, the com-
mittees should contain a majority of members from the municipal authorities
and the chairman should also come from the municipality. The programme was
set out to start July 1. During the course of the programme it was decided that
all ESCs in the country should have a municipal majority and chairman from
October 1. It turned out, however, that there were delays in fulfilling the inten-
tions of the government in both programme and non-programme municipali-
ties. It seems as if lags around 1-3 months have been common regarding the
                                                     
8 Such funding of projects allows resources to be used without some of the restrictions that apply
to regular funding.
9 See Government Bill (1995/96:148). The municipalities in the pilot programme were Ale, Bor-
länge, Falkenberg, Falun, Gullspång, Huddinge, Höganäs,  Lindesberg, Malmö, Norrköping, Ny-
bro, Nyköping, Skellefteå, Skövde, Sundbyberg, Södertälje, Trelleborg, Tyresö, Vara, Varberg,
Vetlanda. Värmdö, Åre, Älmhult and Älvdalen. Two districts in the municipality of Stockholm
(Rinkeby and Skarpnäck) also took part in the programme, but they have been excluded from the
analysis due to lack of data.9
introduction of municipal majorities in the committees, although we lack full
information on this issue.
10
In 1997, the 25 municipalities continued in the programme, which from then
on involved less restrictions regarding the use of the funds, but also require-
ments of partial financing on part of the municipalities (Behrenz et al., 1999).
The government allowed 19 of the municipalities to continue in the programme
during 1998.
Since the first part of the pilot programme (July 1 – September 30) affected
the composition of the committees in only certain areas of the country, it offers
an opportunity to compare outcomes in the decentralised programme munici-
palities versus other, less decentralised, non-programme municipalities. It
should be kept in mind that participation in the programme was not random-
ised. The municipalities decided themselves whether to apply and it was later
decided by the government which applicants to accept into the programme.
It is of interest to note that among those accepted were 13 municipalities
that declined to participate.
11 According to our informal conversations with
government officials, there seems to be two major reasons behind the choice to
withdraw.
12 Firstly, the full details of the programme were not finalised during
the period when applications were due. In particular, it was disclosed only later
that participation in the programme would involve no financial transfers from
the government to the municipalities. Secondly, some municipalities were of
the opinion that they could achieve their objectives regarding labour market
policy without taking part in the programme.
3.2 Diverging objectives?
In this section we examine the objectives, and potential divergence of objec-
tives, of the government (the principal) and the ESCs (the agents). Government
objectives can be found in official policy documents, while information about
                                                     
10 This assumption is based on discussions with government officials and on articles in various
local newspapers.
11 The withdrawals were Arvika, Kalix, Karlskoga, Lysekil, Mariestad, Ronneby, Skara, Sura-
hammar, Trollhättan, Töreboda, Uddevalla, Vänersborg and Örnsköldsvik.
12 Information supplied March 16, 1999, by Runar Eriksson, Ministry of Labour, who was in
charge of the government’s negotiations with the municipalities, and confirmed June 28, 2000,
by Håkan Hellstrand, the Swedish Association of Local Authorities, who was a member of a ref-
erence group for the pilot programme.10
the objectives of the ESC members is not as readily available.
13 However, a
questionnaire was distributed to members in 1999, the results of which are re-
ported in Lundin (1999).
3.2.1 Government objectives at the national level
According to various policy documents the purpose of the ESCs is to design
labour market policies with due consideration to local conditions and needs.
The activities of the ESCs should also take into account national objectives. It
is, for example, stated that it is important that the committees look for solutions
outside the borders of the municipality.
14
Since the ESCs are part of the National Labour Market Administration the
rules that concern the public authority overall also apply to the committees.
15
Accordingly, the ESCs should do the following:
-  match jobseekers with vacancies
-  counteract lock-in effects and inflationary bottlenecks
-  increase flexibility on the labour market
-  adapt labour market programmes to the individual and strengthen his or her
chances of getting a job. However, the activities should not distort compe-
tition or cause displacement effects
-  protect weak groups on the labour market, especially older people and the
occupationally handicapped
There are also quantitative goals for labour market policy, defined on a
year-by-year basis, which indirectly affect the ESCs.
16
                                                     
13 It should be noted that the document beslutsordning, discussed in the beginning of Section 3,
does not specify any objectives regarding the ESCs, only assignments of tasks. Thus there seems
to be no need to, or possibility of, considering the regional level when examining the divergence
of objectives.
14 See Government Regulation (1988:1139) and Government Bill (1995/96:222).
15 Government bill (1998/1999:1), Government Regulation (1988:1139) and Government Regu-
lation (1987:405). For a summary of the rules that concern Swedish labour market policy, see
Bergeskog (1999).
16 For example, according to the “efficiency goals” for 1999 at least 90 percent of the job vacan-
cies should be filled, the number of long-term unemployed should not, on average, exceed
50,000 persons per month and the share in employment within 90 days after vocational labour
market training should be, at least, 70 percent.11
3.2.2 Committee members’ objectives at the local level
Table 1 is based on a questionnaire that was distributed to a sample of ESC
members in 1999. The table, broken down by affiliation, shows the objectives
that the members find relevant for the committees.
The largest group among the respondents, around half, is representatives of
the municipalities.
17 On average, about 80 percent of this group are local politi-
cians and the rest civil servants. It is conceivable that the politicians’ responses
differ from those of the civil servants, but it was not possible to investigate this
issue. One-fifth of the total is made up of members from the County Labour
Boards and PES offices, who, as representatives of the central government,
should see to it that the national objectives are upheld at the local level.
A majority of the respondents state that reducing unemployment and in-
creasing employment are important objectives. Considering that a fundamental
goal of the government is to stimulate employment and counteract unemploy-
ment it is, in our view, somewhat peculiar that no more than three-quarters
consider these to be objectives of the committees. Furthermore, only around
half of the members consider better use of local knowledge about the labour
market and counteracting inflationary bottlenecks to be relevant goals. This is
surprising, since the raison d’être of the “new” ESCs (with a municipal major-
ity) is the possibility they offer of adapting labour market policy to local con-
ditions.
                                                     
17 The share of respondents from municipalities (47.4 percent) is lower than the corresponding
share in the full sample, since non-respondents were somewhat overrepresented in this group.
According to Lundin (1999) municipalities formed the majorities in 56 percent of the committees
sampled and were the largest single group in all committees.12
Table 1. The objectives of the local employment service committees according to their











Reducing unemployment 87 82 74 63 81 77
Increasing employment 92 77 74 75 74 76
Increasing the number of
persons in ALMPs relative
to the number of persons re-
ceiving social assistance
14 35 40 27 33 34
Increasing supply of labour
to municipal projects
4 11 10 10 15 10
Increasing or maintaining
population
24 38 31 20 28 29
Strengthening the use of lo-
cal knowledge about the la-
bour market
80 68 55 44 55 57
Eliminating bottle-neck
problems on the labour
market
77 59 46 39 42 49
Other 14 5 9 15 8 9
No. Obs. 74 78 360 81 166 759
Source: Lundin (1999).
Notes: The question was formulated as follows: “What is the purpose of the local employment service com-
mittees according to your opinion? (Mark as many alternatives as you wish.)”
The results are based on a cluster sample. 83 out of 283 ESCs were randomly selected and the questionnaire
was distributed to all committee members. 977 persons received the questionnaire and the response rate was
78.6 percent. The confidence intervals for the total number of ESC members (the rightmost column) are less
than 5 percentage points. Most differences across subgroups are insignificant due to small sample sizes. Sta-
tistics Sweden assisted with sampling, the construction of the questionnaire and with data collection.
Increasing the number of persons in ALMPs relative to the number of persons
receiving social assistance and increasing or maintaining population are two
alternatives that relatively many committee members have indicated, about
one-third. There are two arguments as to why this may reflect diverging objec-
tives of the principal and the agents.
Firstly, as mentioned the ESCs should look for solutions outside the borders
of the municipality and counteract lock-in effects and inflationary bottlenecks.
This means, among other things, that it is essential that jobseekers are not
locked-in geographically. From a municipal point of view it may however be13
favourable if the population is stable or increases, since a large part of munici-
pal revenues consists of local income taxes. If the committees act with the pur-
pose of achieving population goals, this may run counter to national objectives,
such as reducing unemployment and avoiding bottlenecks through geographical
mobility.
18
Secondly, the national government finances (most of) the labour market
policy, while the municipalities finance social assistance. Hence, there are in-
centives for the municipalities to pass on the costs for social policy to the na-
tional level. A possible interpretation of the survey results is that the munici-
palities actually seek to pass on costs for social policy to the government,
which is another indication of potentially diverging objectives. It is however
possible that local governments are more attentive to the needs of weak groups
on the labour market than are the central actors, due to asymmetric information.
If this is the case, efficiency may be enhanced, not impeded, by the municipali-
ties’ actions. Another possible interpretation of the results is thus that the
members from the municipalities have stressed their traditional responsibility
for weak groups, which is a relevant goal.
Regarding the questions that are designed to capture goals that the commit-
tees are not supposed to strive for, it is seen that the objective “increasing sup-
ply of labour to municipal projects”, is indicated by only around 10 per cent of
the respondents. Furthermore it can be noted that the responses of PES office
members, who are supposed to pay attention to national objectives, do not dif-
fer very much from the responses of the members from the municipalities in
this category of questions.
To the extent that objectives are diverging, this may also reflect unduly
“loose” instructions to and/or monitoring of the committees. According to the
survey a vast majority of the committee members are of the opinion that their
roles and duties are not clearly defined. Another important finding in this con-
text is that only 20 percent of all ESC members regard the education received
for the assignment as sufficient (Lundin, 1999).
It should be kept in mind that expressing views in a survey is one thing,
acting according to these views may be quite another. For example, it is con-
                                                     
18 A specific example that suggests that ESCs may try to achieve population goals comes from a
municipality with much out-migration in northern Sweden, where the committee decided to shift
financial resources from a mobility grant for the unemployed to local labour market programmes.
The County Labour Board later repealed the decision. (Protocols of ESC meetings, dated Febru-
ary 21, 1997, and October 29, 1997, municipality of Arjeplog.)14
ceivable that the presence of members from County Labour Boards and PES
offices effectively restricts the set of possible actions. Another possibility is
that the representatives of PES offices and County Labour Boards collude with
the members from the municipalities. Thus more information is needed about
actual behaviour in the municipalities before any firmer conclusions can be
reached. To this issue we shall return below.
4 Econometric section
4.1 Data and evaluation methodology
The micro-data on individuals used in this study have been extracted from the
events database HÄNDEL, compiled by the National Labour Market Board.
The database contains information on all persons registered at the PES offices.
Information on project organisers has been collected from the Board’s database
Åtgärdsregistret. (The two databases do not contain information on pro-
grammes financed exclusively by the municipalities.) The data source for mu-
nicipal-specific variables is Statistics Sweden.
We have chosen the first and second half-years of 1996 as our periods of
study. It is assumed that the first half-year represents the ”before” period and
the second half-year the ”after” period of decentralisation. The latter does not
fully correspond to the official programme period (July 1 – September 30), but
has been chosen due to the observed delays in implementation (see Section
3.1).
We do not directly observe what the ESCs do, so we focus on two outcome
variables that may be indirectly affected by the activities of the committees:
interregional jobsearch and participation in ALMPs organised by the munici-
pality. The first variable is intended to pick up geographical lock-in effects and
the second variable captures one important aspect of the extent to which deci-
sion-making is decentralised to the municipalities. Both variables are dichoto-
mous, where 1 indicates that the individual searches for a job outside the local
labour market and is enrolled in a municipal project, respectively. Otherwise
the variables take on the value zero.
An important motivation for the choice of the outcome variables is that the
lags are quite short in both cases, which is necessary with our limited period of
study. As soon as a person registers with the PES office it is indicated whether
job search is limited to the local labour market only. It would not be feasible to15
use data on actual migration in order to capture geographical lock-in, since mi-
gration typically occurs only after a long lag.
19 However, Harkman (1988)
claims that there is a strong correlation between the interregional jobsearch
status, as coded in HÄNDEL, and subsequent moves.
Regarding the initiation of ALMPs, the decision-lags are generally not very
long. For example, results in Ohlsson (1993) suggest that the number of per-
sons in job-creation programmes starts to rise three months after an additional
grant has been made to a PES office. The decision-lag concerning the particular
operator of a programme, which is the most relevant lag in our context, is
probably even shorter.
The outcomes in the programme municipalities will be compared to the out-
comes in two groups of  non-programme municipalities. The first group, the
”programme comparisons”, is made up of 25 municipalities with labour market
characteristics similar to those of the 25 programme areas. These municipalities
have been selected by Statistics Sweden (SCB, 1992) and were also used in
Behrenz et al. (1999).
20 Selection criteria include population, employment,
educational variables and industry structure. The second group, the
”withdrawals”, consists of the 13 municipalities that were accepted into the
programme but chose not to participate.
It is argued that the preferences for municipal involvement in labour market
policy among withdrawals resemble the preferences of those in the pilot pro-
gramme. The decision to apply must reasonably reflect such preferences, while
the decision to withdraw mainly seems to have been due to other factors; lack
of additional funding and perceptions that it was possible to achieve objectives
outside the programme were cited as reasons for withdrawal. According to a
study by Bell et al. (1995) on the effects of training programmes, individuals
accepted into the programme, but withdrawing before the start, were the pre-
ferred comparisons for evaluation purposes among a number of ”internal”
groups considered.
21 While this result does not necessarily carry over to our
case, it is at least suggestive of the potential usefulness of employing additional
information about the characteristics of the programme.
                                                     
19 Another drawback with available migration data is that moves that are not labour market re-
lated are included.
20 The programme comparisons are Mark, Sandviken, Karlskrona, Gävle, Götene, Botkyrka, La-
holm, Arvika, Stockholm, Jönköping, Alvesta, Eskilstuna, Härnösand, Växjö, Solna, Haninge,
Ystad, Vaxholm, Tibro, Västervik, Hultsfred, Ekerö, Berg, Tranås and Tanum.
21 The group that most resembles our withdrawals is termed ”no-shows” in Bell et al. (1995).16
In order to assess the effects of the programme, we start by calculating the
well-known double difference, or difference-in-difference, which in our case is
given by
(1)  D
2   =    [YProgramme,  1996:II  - YProgramme, 1996:I ]
                  – [YProgramme comparison, 1996:II   - YProgramme comparison,  1996:I],
where Y is the outcome variable, expressed as a regional average, and subindi-
ces denote region and time.
The assumption behind this estimator is that, were it not for the programme,
outcomes would be similar across ”comparable” regions. This means that all
shocks, except those induced by the programme, had the same effect on the
outcome in both areas.
A problem with the approach in (1) is that it may not provide sufficient
controls for changes that have occurred in  Y. A recent development in the
evaluation literature is to look for additional observations that are assumed to
be unaffected by the programme, but are similar to the programme observa-
tions. (See Hamermesh, 1999, for a discussion and references to applications.)
In our study, it seems natural to include the withdrawals as an extra comparison
region, for reasons discussed above. Thus we will also calculate the triple dif-
ference:
(2)   D
3   =  D
2   -  {[YWithdrawals,  1996:II  - YWithdrawals, 1996:I ]
                  -  [YWithdrawals comparison, 1996:II   - YWithdrawals comparison,  1996:I]}.
Apart from D
2, this expression includes the withdrawals and their respective
comparison group, with similar labour market characteristics (SCB, 1992).
22 To
the extent that the pilot programme does not serve as a binding constraint for
municipalities with similar preferences for municipal involvement in labour
                                                     
22 The withdrawals comparisons are the following 13 municipalities: Ludvika, Övertorneå, Filip-
stad,  Västervik,  Katrineholm,  Lidköping,  Falköping,  Hallstahammar,  Tidaholm,  Hedemora,
Munkedal, Mellerud and Hudiksvall.17
market policy, the estimator in (2) is more likely to capture this property of the
programme than is (1).
Regarding the first outcome variable, interregional jobsearch, we will study
two groups of individuals: unemployed persons and participants in ALMPs. In
HÄNDEL, the unemployed are categorised in various ways. We have chosen
persons who are coded as being able to take up employment immediately
(category 11). This excludes unemployed persons awaiting, e.g., placements in
ALMPs. The chosen category should be the potentially most mobile group in
the short run and therefore suitable for studying lock-in effects. As a compari-
son, participants in ALMPs will be examined.
23 As an average, around 20 per-
cent are recorded as searching interregionally among the unemployed, while a
somewhat lower figure applies for persons in ALMPs.
The second outcome variable, project organiser, is available for only two
types of ALMPs: relief work and Objective 3 measures. Nevertheless, these
programmes are of particular interest in this study. Relief jobs are often associ-
ated with substantial crowding-out effects (see, e.g., Calmfors & Skedinger,
1995, Dahlberg & Forslund, 1999, and Skedinger, 1995). If relief workers are
close substitutes to the regular workforce in municipal services, there may be
incentives for the municipalities to organise relief works. Since the ESCs have
been influential regarding Objective 3 measures, this programme is relevant to
investigate. During the period of study, about 80 percent of relief workers and
30 percent of Objective 3 participants have participated in projects organised
by municipalities.
24
The data have been divided into two time periods, the first and second half
of 1996. Basically the data are two repeated cross-sections of individuals. The
observational unit is one spell in the relevant registration category (unemployed
or participant in ALMP). This means that one individual may be included more
than once in the data, to the extent that the category has changed more than
once during the period (e.g., unemployed – ALMP – unemployed). Apparently
                                                     
23 Due to too few observations in the first half-year of 1996, it was not possible to consider par-
ticipants in Objective 3 measures.
24 There are also some programmes where all projects are organised by the municipality, e.g. the
Municipal Youth Programme ( kommunala  ungdomsprogrammet) and Computer Centres ( da-
tortek). We have not examined these programmes, due to the analytical disadvantage of having to
explain the variation in the total number of participants across municipalities. This factor is held
constant when the municipal share in a given ALMP is considered.18
miscoded observations, e.g., cases where the registration date is later than the
date of deregistration, have been excluded.
The inclusion criteria are the following:
-  age 18-64 years
-  registration in the category occurred  during the relevant half-year
-  first-time registration occurred during 1996 (interregional jobsearch only)
The second criterion means, inter alia, that spells continuing into the second
period are included in the first half-year only. The third criterion should mini-
mise problems with lags as persons may change jobsearch behaviour over time,
without a corresponding change in the coding of interregional search.
We have, as a general rule, classified the data into different regions based
on the individual’s municipality of residence. This applies to all analyses of
interregional jobsearch. When investigating project organisers, a more suitable
basis for classification is the municipality of the project organiser. The two
variables do not coincide in all cases, due to, e.g., commuting. As this informa-
tion was available only for Objective 3 programmes, the individual’s munici-
pality of residence had to be used for relief works.
Background information about the municipalities is presented in Table 2
below. The data refer to 1995, i.e., before the pilot programme started. It can be
noted that total unemployment (open unemployment plus labour market pro-
grammes) is about the same in programme and non-programme areas, around
13 percent. In the former, population has increased by two percent during the
period 1991-95, as opposed to stagnation elsewhere. Furthermore, municipal
employment accounts for somewhat less of total employment (21 percent) than
is the case in the non-programme regions (23 percent). The social assistance
rate (8 percent of the population) is slightly higher in the programme munici-
palities, but the difference is small. On the whole, there is little evidence to
suggest that economic conditions have been worse in the programme areas than
elsewhere.
Table 2 also reveals that the indicators take on rather similar values in pro-
gramme municipalities and programme comparisons. In particular, this is true
for change in population. Hence the two regions seem to match quite well as19
far as characteristics are concerned.
25 However, the withdrawals, as well as the
withdrawals comparisons, differ in important respects from the programme
municipalities. For example, total unemployment is higher (15 percent) and
population has decreased during the period 1991-95. Apparently the economic
situation in the withdrawals municipalities has been more problematic than in
the programme regions.












Population 48,368 29,005 66,965 29,605 22,693
Population Change
1991-95, %
2.2  0.3 2.0 - 0.2 - 0.9
Unemployment Rate, % 7.9 7.5 7.5 8.9 8.8
Labour Market
Programme Rate, %
4.7 5.5 4.7 6.2 6.6
Vacancy Rate, % 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
Municipal
Employment, %
20.6 22.5 20.2 22.4 23.7
Social Assistance Recipi-
ents, %
7.8 7.2 7.3 7.7 7.3
Socialist Parties’ Seats in
Local Council, %
50.7 50.9 48.3 57.5 55.5
No. Obs. 25 263 25 13 13
Note: See text for a list of municipalities included in the programme, withdrawals and comparison groups.
Source: Statistics Sweden.
                                                     
25 Average population is about one third larger among the comparisons, which is partly explained
by the fact that that the largest city in the country, Stockholm, is included in this group.20
In Tables 3 and 4, data on the outcome variables are shown for the two peri-
ods that are used in the analysis, i.e., the first and second half-year of 1996. The
share of interregional jobsearchers is lower in programme than in non-
programme areas, but has in both areas increased over time. The extent to
which programmes are organised by the municipality differs greatly by pro-
gramme type. The shares have, however, increased in both types of munici-
palities (with the exception of relief works in non-programme regions).
Table 3. Registrations as interregional jobsearcher, by type of municipality and period,
1996.
a. Spells of unemployed persons





Pilot Programme 49,714 17.61 55,872 19.09
Non-programme 307,310 20.77 338,549 21.96
b. Spells of participants in ALMPs





Pilot Programme 6,919 16.79 17,304 18.04
Non-programme 42,927 20.22 99,815 21.9821
Table 4. Participation in ALMPs organised by the municipality, by type of municipality
and period, 1996.
a. Spells of persons in relief works
I: Jan 1 – June 30 II: July 1 – Dec 31 Type of municipality
No. obs. Organised by the
municipality, %
No. obs. Organised by the
municipality, %
Pilot Programme 1,723 80.21 1,306 80.70
Non-programme 9,881 80.20 6,718 77.82
b. Spells of persons in Objective 3 programmes
I: Jan 1 – June 30 II: July 1 – Dec 31 Type of municipality
No. obs. Organised by the
municipality, %
No. obs. Organised by the
municipality, %
Pilot Programme 477 6.50 1,953 31.80
Non-programme 6,939 24.76 15,916 29.95
4.2 The econometric model
The double and triple differences will be estimated within a regression frame-
work, which allows controlling for differences in various characteristics across
regions that may affect outcomes.
(3)  Yi,m,t    =  a0 + X i,m,t a1 + Zm,t a2  +
b1Pm + b2PCm + b3Wm + b4WCm + c1996:II t +
d1Pm  1996:II t + d2PCm  1996:II t +
d3Wm  1996:II t + d4WCm  1996:II t + ei,m,t,
where subindices denote individual i, municipality m and half-year t. X is a
vector of person-specific variables and Z is a vector of region-specific vari-
ables. The various regions are represented by dummy variables P (programme
municipalities),  PC (programme comparisons),  W (withdrawals) and  WC22
(withdrawals comparisons), the reference region being the rest of the country,
while the second half-year is captured by the dummy 1996:II.
In this study attention will be focused on the four variables where the region
dummies are interacted with the time dummy (P  x 1996:II etc.), since the coef-
ficients may be used for estimation of  the ”standardised” double and triple dif-
ferences. Note that
(1´)    D
2´         =     d1 – d2   
(2´)    D
3´         =     d1 – d2  – (d3 – d4 ),
which can be compared to the corresponding ”raw” double and triple differ-
ences in (1) and (2), respectively. Finally, e denotes an error term with the
usual properties.
As mentioned earlier, interregional jobsearch and municipal project owner-
ship will be used as dependent variables. It is assumed that interregional job-
search is determined by the same factors as actual migration, so the standard
variables that apply in econometric analyses of regional migration will be used
as regressors (see, e.g., Greenwood, 1985, for a survey). This amounts to in-
cluding the following person-specific variables in X: (i) age, since the payoff to
migration should decrease with increasing age; (ii) level of education, which is
expected to improve knowledge about job opportunities elsewhere; (iii) foreign
citizenship, a control variable which is supposed to pick up informational dis-
advantages as well as smaller investments in ”local networks”, hence the ex-
pected sign is ambiguous. Regarding the region-wide variables in Z, the hy-
pothesis is that labour market conditions, relative to other regions, influence
search behaviour. Higher unemployment and a lower vacancy rate will thus en-
courage out-migration, as assumed in the literature.
Basically the same explanatory variables as above will be used in the re-
gressions with municipal project ownership as the dependent variable. This al-
lows testing the hypothesis of outsider targeting. Outsiders will be defined as
persons with primary school education only and/or with non-Swedish citizen-
ship.
4.3 The econometric results
The estimation method is binomial logit. In order to check the robustness of the
results, we have successively added more controls. In the first set of regres-
sions, only person-specific controls are included, whereas the region-specific23
variables are added in the second set. County dummies, capturing region-
specific fixed effects, are included in the third and final set. The regression ta-
bles show the beta parameters, which yield information about the direction of
the effects but are not readily interpreted in terms of the marginal impact (see,
e.g., Greene, 1993). For some variables, e.g., the interactions that are intended
to capture the pilot programme effects, the marginal effects are of particular
interest. In those cases the slope coefficients, which indicate the marginal ef-
fects of a unit increase in the regressor, will be presented in separate tables or
mentioned in the text.
Table 5 shows the estimations for interregional jobsearch. The upper panel
presents results for the unemployed and the lower panel displays the regres-
sions for participants in ALMPs. Largely, the regressions perform according to
the predictions from migration theory. As age increases, the individual is less
inclined to look for jobs outside the local labour market and the negative effect
also tends to become larger with age. Higher education is associated with a
larger propensity to search interregionally, while non-Swedish citizens are less
likely to do so. The latter result particularly applies to citizens from countries
outside Western Europe (with the exception of North America). The labour
market variables in most cases yield results conforming to expectations. In
general, the coefficient is positive for the unemployment variable, i.e., munici-
pal unemployment relative to the country as a whole, while the opposite holds
for the relative vacancy rate. However, the vacancy variables come in with an
unexpected positive sign in the regressions with county dummies.
The regressions 1.b – 3 in Table 5.b control for type of ALMP. It is seen
that persons who are not participating in vocational labour market training (the
reference category) are with few exceptions less likely to be registered as
interregional jobsearchers. In particular, participants in programmes that are
exclusively organised by the municipality, namely the Municipal Youth Pro-
gramme and Computer Centres tend to search less outside the local labour
market. The slope coefficients (not shown) range around – 0.05. Whether the
coefficients represent a causal effect of these programmes or is due to selection
of  individuals with particular characteristics into municipal programmes can-
not be inferred from the regressions.24
Table 5. Maximum-likelihood parameter estimates of the binomial logit model, 1996.
Dependent variable: Interregional jobsearch.
a. Unemployed persons.
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Variable (1.a) (2) (3)
Type of Municipality:
  Pilot Programme (P)
  Programme Comparison (PC)
  Withdrawals (W)
































   P x 1996:II
   PC x 1996:II
   W x 1996:II





































County Dummies No No Yes
No. Observations 751,445 726,843 726,843
2 Log L - 745,885 - 716,930 - 696,411
Notes: Intercept and county dummies not shown. The reference category for Education is primary
school, for Citizenship Swedish and for Type of municipality the rest of the country. Standard errors
in parentheses.26
b. Participants in ALMPs.
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   Recruitment Subsidy
   Start-up Grant
   Relief Work
   Work Experience Scheme
   Replacement Scheme
   Workplace Introduction
   Public Temporary Work
   Computer Centre
   Municipal Youth Programme






























































Variable (1.a) (1.b) (2) (3)
Type of Municipality:
   Pilot Programme (P)
  Programme Comparison (PC)
  Withdrawals (W)










































   P x 1996:II
   PC x 1996:II
   W x 1996:II













































County Dummies No No No Yes
No. Observations 166,965 166,965 161,102 161,102
2 Log L - 165,749 - 165,067 - 158,811 - 154,329
Notes: The reference category for Type of programme is Vocational labour market training (AMU).
See also notes to Table 5.a.
Before discussing the estimated effects of the pilot programme, we turn to the
regressions with municipal project ownership as the dependent variable. The
regressions in Table 6 basically repeat the format of the previous table. The top
panel refers to relief workers and the bottom one to participants in Objective 3
programmes.28
Table 6. Maximum-likelihood parameter estimates of the binomial logit model, 1996.
Dependent variable: Participation in ALMP organised by the municipality.
a. Relief workers.
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Variable (1.a) (2) (3)
Interactions:
   P x 1996:II
   PC x 1996:II
   W x 1996:II





































County Dummies No No Yes
No. Observations 19,628 19,386 19,386
2 Log L - 19,244 - 18,889 - 17,292
Notes: See notes to Table 5.a.30
b. Participants in Objective 3 programmes.
Variable (1.a) (1.b) (2) (3)

















    High School


















   Nordic
   Western  Europe
   Eastern Europe
   North America
   South America
   Asia

























































Type of Objective 3 Programme:
   Paths to Employment
   Start-up
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Variable (1.a) (1.b) (2) (3)









   P x 1996:II
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County Dummies No No No Yes
No. Observations 25,285 25,285 23,408 23,408
2 Log L - 27,897 - 27,237 - 24,605 - 15,844
Notes: The reference category for Type of Objective 3 programme is the Competence Scheme (Kom-
petensutveckling). See also notes to Table 5.a.
On the whole, the results suggest that the municipalities target the programmes
towards outsiders to a larger extent than is the case with other organisers, as
predicted earlier.
26 Persons with the lowest education, i.e., primary school, tend
to be overrepresented. Municipal relief work is targeted towards non-Swedish
citizens, and the effect is larger for persons from countries outside Western
Europe and North America. The opposite result is obtained for Objective 3
programmes, however, where Swedish citizens are more likely than others to
be in a municipal project. In order to keep this result in perspective, it should
be remembered that Objective 3 programmes as a whole are strongly targeted
towards outsiders, as mentioned in Section 3.
What, then, about the estimated effects of the pilot programme? The double
(D
2) and triple (D
3) differences are displayed in Tables 7.a and 7.b. The first
two columns reproduce the raw differences, and the estimates in the remaining
columns correspond to the various specifications used in the regressions. The
                                                     
26 In principle, participation in relief works and Objective 3 programmes organised by the mu-
nicipality, as opposed to other organisers, could be driven by self-selection. The concept of tar-
geting applies also in this case, however.32
slope coefficients, on which the calculations are based, are shown in the appen-
dix (Table A).
Table 7. Estimated effects of the pilot programme. Double (D
2) and triple (D
3) differ-
ences, with successively more controls.
a. Interregional jobsearch.





















† 0.0058 0.0117 0.0025 0.0086 0.0018 0.0129 0.0111 0.0192
b. Participation in ALMP organised by municipality.












Relief Workers 0.0269 0.1450
‡ 0.0188 0.0980



















Notes: The estimates in Models 1 – 3 are based on the corresponding columns in Tables 5, 6 and A. The significance
indicators are based on standard errors for the beta parameters, which may not necessarily be equal to the standard
errors for the slope coefficients. † = significance at 10 per cent level. ‡ = significance at 5 per cent level.
According to Table 7.a there is no evidence of geographical lock-in effects of
the pilot programme. On the contrary, the estimates are positive in general, al-
though small and in most cases insignificant. Thus the hypothesis that the pro-
pensity to register as an interregional jobsearcher in the programme region de-
creased during the programme period is rejected. The estimated effects range
from zero to one percentage point’s increase for the unemployed and from zero
to three percentage points’ increase for the participants in ALMPs. The results
do not differ much across differencing methods or across regression specifica-
tions.
Table 7.b summarises the results for municipal programme participation.
The hypothesis that local initiatives, in the form of municipalities organising
ALMPs, increased in the programme regions receives strong support. The es-
timated effects are larger for Objective 3 programmes than for relief works (19-
57 and 2-15 percentage points, respectively). The triple differences tend to be33
larger than double differences, which suggests that the pilot programme may
actually have served as a binding constraint on behaviour. Furthermore, the tri-
ple differences are more stable than the double differences across model speci-
fications. A possible interpretation of this result is that the former estimator is
better at capturing shocks to the outcome variable.
Do the estimations represent true effects of the programme? It is important
to note that the unbiasedness of the estimators hinges on the assumption of
exogeneity. Furthermore, the econometric specification in (3) may be too re-
strictive. These issues are discussed below.
(i) Exogeneity of  programme participation
As mentioned, the data are not experimental in the strict sense. Although the
municipalities were not randomly assigned to the programme, it is not unrea-
sonable to assume that being in the programme is exogeneous to the individuals
who make decisions about interregional jobsearch classification (i.e., the job-
less and PES office workers) and decide on details regarding local labour mar-
ket projects (i.e., ESC members and PES office workers).
27 However, this is a
difficult problem and we cannot know with certainty that our results represent
the true programme effects.
(ii) Exogeneity of  programme timing
We do not know exactly when the (first part of the) pilot programme started
and ended in the municipalities. If the timing of the programme is endogenous,
the estimates are biased (Morrison Piehl et al., 1999). However, the munici-
palities were required by law to implement the programme, so we believe that
the possibilities to act strategically regarding its timing were limited.
(iii) Duration of programme
A short programme duration biases the estimated effects towards zero. The du-
ration of our programme may have been too short for lock-in effects to appear,
despite the fact that we have chosen quick indicators. Under the assumption
that the jobless do not anticipate changes in municipal labour market policy
following decentralisation (see Section 2), interregional jobsearch may well be
slower to adapt than the behaviour of local authorities. In principle, extending
                                                     
27Thus the evaluation problem seems less severe in our case than in analyses of the effects of,
e.g., training programmes, where individuals may self-select into the programme.34
the period of analysis could mitigate this problem. Unfortunately, it is not suit-
able in our case to extend the period to include 1997, when all ESCs had a mu-
nicipal majority, in order to compare outcomes with the programme regions.
The latter continued in the second part of the programme in 1997, so conditions
have not remained the same there, which limits the usefulness of this approach.
(iv) Allowing for region and time-specific coefficients of control variables
The specification in (3) imposes the restriction that the coefficients in X and Z
are the same across regions and over time. We have relaxed this assumption by
introducing additional interactions in the regressions. The conclusions from
Table 7 remained unchanged.
(v) Allowing for group-specific programme effects
It is conceivable that aggregating the data over all age groups has obscured
lock-in effects for young people. As a further check on our results, we intro-
duced interactions in the regressions allowing for separate programme effects
for persons aged 18-24. No lock-in effects were detected, however.
(vi) Allowing for additional control variables
In the regressions with municipal organiser of ALMPs as the dependent vari-
able, we have added most of the variables in Table 2, not already included, as
extra controls. The programme effects did not change much.
5 Conclusions
We have evaluated the effects of a pilot programme, which implied a shift to-
wards more decentralised decision-making in labour market policy. To be spe-
cific, the programme involved the introduction of a municipal majority in local
employment service committees in parts of the country in 1996.
Results from a questionnaire to committee members suggest a non-
negligible divergence between the objectives of the members and the national
objectives for labour market policy, as manifested in official documents. For
example, committee members seem to put some emphasis on population goals
and getting people off social assistance and into labour market programmes.
This could impinge on the fulfilment of national objectives regarding mobility
of the unemployed and the efficiency of active measures.35
Our econometric results, based on a large micro-data set, indicate that de-
centralisation spurred local initiatives in the form of a rise in the share of par-
ticipants in relief works and Objective 3 programmes with the municipality as
organiser. Furthermore, targeting on outsiders is, to some extent, more common
in municipal projects than in others. We have considered only two types of ac-
tive measures and the generality of this result as far as other programmes are
concerned remains to be investigated. As regards potential consequences of di-
verging objectives, we have not detected any geographical lock-in effects (al-
though this finding may be due to too brief a programme period). The above
findings turned out to be robust to numerous checks.
As far as we know, this is the first econometric study dealing with the issues
considered here. It goes without saying that more research on the effects of de-
centralisation of labour market policy is needed in order to assess the generality
of our results.36
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Appendix
Table A. Slope coefficients of interaction variables in Tables 5 and 6.
Interactions Model 1.a Model 1.b Model 2 Model 3
Table 5.a:
   P x 1996:II
   PC x 1996:II
   W x 1996:II
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   W x 1996:II














   P x 1996:II
   PC x 1996:II
   W x 1996:II
   WC x 1996:II
0.2656
  0.0129
- 0.0239
 0.1610
0.2743
  0.0054
- 0.0323
 0.1578
0.3246
  0.0422
- 0.0166
 0.1662
0.3950
 - 0.0128
 0.1102
 0.1122